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Abstract
We estimate the Marginal Cost of Public Funds for Argentina using a 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, assessing the sensitivity 
of the results to the existence of alternative regulatory regimes (price-cap 
and cost-plus) for public utilities subject to regulation. The estimates are 
in the range of international studies, and we confirm that the results are 
sensitive to the regulatory regime, to the presence of exempted goods, the 
existence of unemployment, the elasticity of labor supply, as well as to the 
degree of capital mobility, between sectors and internationally. In addition, 
our results highlight the existence of differential propensity to finance public 
projects under price-cap regimes vis-à-vis cost-plus regimes.
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Resumen
En este trabajo se estima el Costo Marginal de los Fondos Públicos para 
Argentina empleando un Modelo de Equilibrio General Computado. Se 
evalúa la sensibilidad de los resultados respecto de la existencia de re-
gímenes regulatorios alternativos (“price-cap” y “cost-plus”) para los 
servicios públicos regulados. Las estimaciones obtenidas están en línea 
con la evidencia empírica internacional, y confirman que los resultados 
son sensibles al régimen regulatorio, la presencia de bienes exentos, la 
existencia de desempleo, la elasticidad de la oferta de trabajo, como así 
también al grado de movilidad del capital, entre sectores e internacional. 
Adicionalmente, los resultados señalan la existencia de diferentes propen-
siones a financiar proyectos públicos bajo régimen de “price-cap” vis-à-vis 
regímenes de “cost-plus”.
Palabras Clave: Costo marginal fondos públicos, regulación, equilibrio 
general, Argentina.
Clasificación JEL: H22, D58, L5.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Marginal Cost of Public Funds (MCPF) measures the change in social welfare 
that is generated by a marginal increase in tax revenue. Consequently, a public project 
must produce marginal benefits higher than the MCPF to be welfare improving. 
Holding public revenue constant, welfare can be increased by reducing taxes with 
the highest MCPF and increasing those with the lowest MCPF. Therefore, estimates 
of the MCPF provide guidelines for reform of tax structures and help to choose how 
to finance public projects.
An exploration of the most important literature on the MCPF shows that it is 
usually computed assuming that there are no regulated sectors in the economy. On 
the other hand, the literature on regulation assumes that the MCPF is independent of 
the regulatory regime (for example, see Laffont and Tirole’s 1993 classical text). Here 
we analyze the interaction between the tax system and the regulatory regime.
Is the MCPF lower/higher under no regulation, price-cap, or cost-plus? Is there a 
different propensity in the granting of subsidies and in the financing of public projects 
under any of the alternative regimes? In this paper, to explore these issues we compute 
the MCPF for Argentina by implementing a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
model calibrated to the year 2004. This is relevant because regulated sectors represent 
a significant share of total GDP in Argentina, as well as in many other countries. 
Moreover, competition policy and public intervention even in competitive markets 
often determine implicit caps on prices via threat of regulation. Actual regulatory 
regimes are not pure, and seem to respond to a combination of short term price-cap 
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and long run cost-plus regime. Even the pass-through of taxes to regulated prices is 
imperfect or delayed. Therefore, our work tries to highlight how the choice of the 
actual regulatory regime impacts on the marginal cost of public funds itself.
We compare the effects of a change in the tax system under different regulatory 
regimes and test the sensitivity of our results to different specifications for the labor 
market (i.e., full employment and unemployment), as well as to alternative assumptions 
on factor mobility between sectors, and –in order to take into account the results 
when dividends are paid to foreign residents– between the domestic economy and 
the rest of the world.
The paper is organized as follows. The next Section is devoted to a brief discussion 
of the literature on the calculation of the MCPF in developing and developed countries. 
Section 3 explains how a CGE model can be adapted to consider two alternative 
regulatory regimes: price-cap and cost-plus. Section 4 presents a description of our 
CGE model. In Section 5 we report our main results and present estimates of the 
MCPF under different assumptions. Finally, Section 6 concludes. In the Appendix 
we present the analytical version of the CGE model.
2. LITERATURE ON THE MCPF
The formal analysis of the MCPF started with the work of Pigou (1928).1 He argued 
that, in order to determine the optimal level of public spending, the government must 
take into account the distortionary effect of raising taxes. In turn, the distortionary effect 
of raising taxes creates a deadweight loss or welfare cost that depends on the elasticities 
of the labor and capital supply (hours worked, job type, human capital accumulation, 
and so on), the composition of the consumption basket, and the propensity to save.2 
As we show below, all these elements have an important role in CGE calculations, 
and of course in our own estimates.
Browning (1976) explains that “the marginal cost of public funds is the social 
opportunity cost of government spending”. He shows that the MCPF includes any 
expenditure that arises from the tax system. Following this, it can be said that there 
is a more comprehensive definition of MCPF, one that includes the administrative 
costs of collecting government revenue and other “hidden costs”, like tax evasion 
and corruption (Usher, 1991). However, the lack of data, especially in developing 
countries, constitutes an important barrier in conducting estimations that include all 
these effects.
Atkinson and Stern (1974) point out that the MCPF can be decomposed into 
the substitution and income effects, which they call the “distortionary effect” and 
the “revenue effect”, respectively. The “distortionary effect” is the deadweight loss 
1 “Expenditure should be pushed in all directions up to the point at which the satisfaction obtained from 
the last shilling expended is equal to the satisfaction lost in respect to the last shilling called up on 
government service” (Pigou, 1928).
2 See Feldstein (1997).
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mentioned above. The “revenue effect” depends on the outcome of the “income 
effect” on tax revenue.3
Ballard and Fullerton (1992) distinguish two methods to calculate the MCPF. 
According to the first one, known as the Pigou-Harberger-Browning approach, one 
has to compare distortions in the tax system with an equal-revenue lump-sum tax.4 
This approach is more concerned with the structure of the tax system than with the 
overall level of taxation. The second method, the Stiglitz-Dasgupta-Atkinson-Stern 
approach (Stiglitz and Dasgupta, 1971), states that the MCPF not only depends on 
the substitution effect but also on the income effect. It assumes that the increase 
in revenue is used to finance public projects, which are independent of the supply 
of labor.5
Our paper relies on the Pigou-Harberger-Browning approach to calculate 
the MCPF. In particular, we use Browning’s (1976) approach by assuming 
that increases in public spending are considered as lump-sum transfers to the 
households.6
Since the publication of Harberger’s seminal work (Harberger, 1962), the 
number of studies that calculate the distortions induced by the tax system has 
grown considerably. The development of computational economics made it possible 
to use general equilibrium models to calculate the MCPF. For example, Warlters 
and Auriol (2005) have recently estimated the MCPF for several African countries 
using a small CGE model. In Table 1 we show literature estimates of the MCPF 
for various countries. The estimations are in a range that goes from 0.48 (when 
there is a marginal benefit of public funds) up to 2.65, although they are not strictly 
comparable as their methodologies differ. We will see that our results for Argentina 
are in that range.
As mentioned above, we investigate whether the calculation of the MCPF should 
consider the existence of alternative regulatory regimes. The literature on the economics 
of regulation assumes that the MCPF is independent of the regulatory regime (Laffont 
3 Ballard and Fullerton (1992) claim that “Since the income effect of wage taxation increases work effort 
and therefore increases government revenue, it works toward a lower marginal cost of public funds”.
4 Musgrave takes a “differential analysis” view to calculate the MCPF. Depending on the assumptions, 
this approach can also be included in the “Balanced-Budget Analysis” if we assume that the government 
provides private goods publicly –see Stiglitz (2000). As Browning (1987) poses it, “if the marginal 
government spending provides benefits that are a perfect substitute for the disposable income of taxpay-
ers, then the spending is only an income effect that is equivalent to a lump sum transfer… This may 
be largely correct in cases involving government provision of schooling, medical care, pensions, and 
other things taxpayers would purchase with their disposable income if the government did not provide 
them”. However, as Atkinson and Stern (1974) note, the level of complementarity of public spending 
and private spending will be determined by the type of goods that the public sector provides. If the 
government provides public goods, public spending will complement private goods and Browning’s 
argument does not hold. 
5 With this method the “balanced-budget analysis” approach (Musgrave, 1959) prevails, which incorporates 
the increase in government spending in calculating the MCPF. 
6 However, it will be observed that the MCPF can be less than one in our calculations, as it happens 
in the Stiglitz-Dasgupta-Atkinson-Stern version. As explained below, the reason can be found in the 
distributive story in an economy open to foreign capital, when tax rebates are restricted to reach only 
domestic agents.
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and Tirole, 1993). However, the MCPF is very important in choosing the power of 
incentives in the regulatory regime; if the MCPF is low, then the cost of transfers to 
an inefficient service provider is also relatively small. We will see that the hypothesis 
of independence of the MCPF as regards the regulatory regime can be challenged, 
particularly when dealing with economies where high distortionary levels of taxation 
are already present and when these economies are open to the rest of the world. This 
is also interesting because it can be read in the opposite direction: if the MCPF varies 
according to the regulatory regime, the design of the optimal regulatory framework 
will have to take that information into account.
TABLE 1
ESTIMATIONS OF THE MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS
Country Tax Instrument Estimate Source
Australia Labor 1.19-1.24 Campbell and Bond (1997)
Australia Labor 1.28-1.55 Findlay and Jones (1982)
Australia Capital 1.21-1.48 Diewert and Lawrence (1998)
Australia Capital 1.15-1.51 Benge (1999)
Bangladesh Sales 0.95-1.07 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Bangladesh Imports 1.17-2.18 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Cameroon Sales 0.48-0.96 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Cameroon Imports 1.05-1.37 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Canada Commodities 1.25 Campbell (1975)
Canada Labor 1.38 Dahlby (1994)
Canada Labor 1.39-1.53 Fortin and Lacroix (1994)
China Sales 2.31 Laffont and Senik-Leygonie (1997)
India Excise 1.66-2.15 Ahmad and Stern (1987)
India Sales 1.59-2.12 Ahmad and Stern (1987)
India Imports 1.54-2.17 Ahmad and Stern (1987)
Indonesia Sales 0.97-1.11 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Indonesia Imports 0.99-1.18 Devarajan et al. (2001)
New Zealand Labor 1.18 Diewert and Lawrence (1994)
Switzerland All taxes 1.69-2.29 Hansson and Stuart (1985)
United States All taxes 1.17-1.56 Ballard et al. (1985)
United States Labor 1.21-1.24 Stuart (1984)
United States Labor 1.32-1.47 Browning (1987)
United States All taxes 1.47 Jorgenson and Yun (1990)
United States Labor 1.08-1.14 Ahmed and Croushore (1994)
United States All taxes 2.65 Feldstein (1997)
United States All taxes 1.23 Diewert et al. (1998)
United States All taxes 1.07 Browning (1976)
United States All taxes 1.18 Browning (1976)
Source: Author’s elaboration and Warlters and Auriol (2005).
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3. COMPUTATIONAL REPRESENTATION OF PRICE-CAP AND
 COST-PLUS UNDER SERVICE OBLIGATION
The literature on regulatory regimes under asymmetric information assumes 
that the MCPF is independent of the regulatory regime7, and proceeds to select the 
optimal power of incentives under that assumption. We use our model to evaluate if 
that assumption is reasonable for a real economy in which regulated sectors represent 
a significant share of GDP.
Advances in the economics of regulation over the last 30 years are overwhelming.8 
In the new regulatory economics, information has the role of a scarce factor and the 
presence of asymmetric information generates rents and distortions that have private 
and social costs. Thus, the contractual link between the regulator and the regulated 
firm can be interpreted as a particular case of the broader relationship between the 
Principal and the Agent within a context of risk under asymmetric information.
Both under “moral hazard” or “adverse selection”, it is necessary to design a 
contract that balances risk sharing and information disclosure. In most models, it is 
the Principal who designs the contract, and the Agent who accepts or rejects it. The 
optimal contract is therefore obtained by maximizing the welfare of the Principal 
(almost always a risk neutral economic agent) subject to constraints that take into 
account the problem of utility maximization of the Agent. Firstly, the Agent (risk 
averse) must not obtain a reward (in terms of utility) lower than what he/she could 
obtain elsewhere in the economy (the Participation Constraint). Secondly, the Agent 
must not benefit from cheating about his characteristics or actions (the Incentive 
Compatibility Constraint).
In this context, two “pure” methods are usually proposed to regulate the prices 
of licensed or privatized activities which are natural monopolies, price-cap and cost-
plus regulation. Under the first one, the price of the product or service is fixed and 
the regulated firm faces all the risk. If costs rise, the regulator will not rescue the firm 
in any way (e.g., by raising the price or giving a direct subsidy to the firm). On the 
other hand, if costs fall, the firm will obtain profits to be distributed as dividends to 
shareholders. The price-cap regime reduces the monitoring cost by granting the firm 
a market incentive to maximize efficiency in its internal processes. However, although 
it reduces the rents from asymmetric information, the price-cap regime increases 
the risk premium necessary to induce the firm’s participation. In contrast, under the 
cost-plus regime, the firm is assured a certain rate of return as the regulator rescues 
7 See for example Laffont and Tirole’s classical text (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). The reciprocal effect 
has been considered for example by Desai and Dharmapala (2004); they look at how the power of 
incentives to managers depends on the tax system. 
8 For example, the introduction of the revelation principle made an extraordinary simplification possible 
by showing that there is no loss of generality if the number of contracts is reduced as much as possible to 
the number of types of agents. A more general theory for natural monopolies (based on the subadditivity 
of costs to justify its existence) was developed, and Ramsey pricing was extended to take into account 
“revenue cap” and access fees. Additionally, the relationship between efficient regulation and income 
distribution was more firmly established (based on the concepts of service obligation and of universal 
service).
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the firm in the case of a negative shock; but the ever-present risk makes it difficult 
to discriminate between increases in genuine and speculative costs. Therefore, the 
firm has no incentive to reduce costs and increase efficiency. This results in potential 
efficiency losses and the need to collect revenue through distortionary taxes to cover 
the firm’s deficit. The MCPF gives an estimate of the losses in terms of resource 
allocation due to that transfer or subsidy to the firm. In the literature on regulation, it 
is taken as a parameter and, once estimated, its value is used to determine the optimal 
power of incentives. In this paper, we assess if the power of incentives could, in turn, 
influence the actual value of the MCPF.
In practice, none of those two methods for pricing regulated sectors is applied in 
its purest forms. For example, it can be said that price-cap prevails in the regulation 
of public utilities in Argentina, but periodic reviews are conducted to move regulated 
price to levels that guarantee a “fair and reasonable” rate of return, and then the 
regulatory regime becomes similar to a cost-plus. Also, in most regulated sectors, 
costs are discriminated between those that are under control of the firm or beyond it. 
Some taxes are allowed to be passed to prices, but that is not the general case, and 
it can be argued that in many cases they change relative prices and a very accurate 
vision is required to pass-through all of them instantaneously to capped prices without 
a general equilibrium evaluation.
How do we represent those alternative regulatory regimes in our model?9 The 
regulated sectors receive no special treatment regarding their production technology. 
The difference with the rest of the sectors lies in the way in which the price of the 
product is defined and the treatment of the service obligation. In fact, we take advantage 
of the service obligation restriction to avoid the problem of rationing.10 Under service 
obligation, the firm must satisfy all of the demand; depending on the case, it has two 
alternatives: (1) producing more with the available technology and capital stock but 
adding other factors (like labor), and absorbing the difference between the fixed price 
and the average cost; or (2) using an alternative technology with constant returns to 
scale that allows an increase in the capital stock with an average cost that is similar 
to the fixed price.
In the first case, as a consequence of the service obligation restriction, the firm 
can have a loss. In that case, a (negative) tax on the firm’s shareholders resolves the 
problem of the analytical formulation without violating the zero profit condition. If, 
instead, the demand level falls below the level that would support the regulated price, 
the model computes an ad-valorem tax on the (Walrasian) price that the shareholders 
receive; the objective is reached if the price (pR1) plus tax t gives the fixed price P 
(Figure 1). When regulation is by cost-plus, the tax (to or from the shareholders) 
helps to maintain the “fair and reasonable” rate of return. Summarizing, the tax rate 
is determined as another endogenous variable according to one of the following 
conditions: (1) the real price for the firm is kept constant, or (2) the real rate of return 
9 This discussion is based on Chisari, Estache and Romero (1999) and Chisari, Estache and Romero 
(2007).
10 The concept of universal service is more demanding; the price must be low enough so that the target 
population can take advantage of the service. The price is not passive under service obligation.
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for the firm is kept constant. Notice that in the case of a price-cap regulatory regime, 
the return to the installed capital will adjust until profits are exhausted.11
We should also keep in mind that this way of representing the regulatory regimes 
has analogies with an endogenous determination of a tax rate, whose recipient is at 
times the public sector, and at times the firm’s shareholders. We can rely therefore on 
the already available proofs of existence of a general equilibrium with taxes.12
4. THE CGE MODEL
To estimate the MCPF, we implement a static small open economy CGE 
model for Argentina.13 In order to calibrate our CGE model, we built a 2004 SAM 
for Argentina; see Table 2 for an aggregated SAM.14 The economic activity is 
disaggregated in 29 sectors. For these sectors, output is exported or sold domestically, 
competing with imports (Armington, 1969). The SAM identifies three types of labor: 
formal salaried workers, informal salaried workers, and non-salaried workers. The 
11 The question remains whether the firm would not prefer a value below P. For the range of the accepted 
parameters in our model and for the magnitude of the shocks considered, the price-cap was always 
operative. 
12 Shoven and Whalley (1973) provide a demonstration, while Ginsburgh and Keyzer (1997) present a 
summary of the literature.
13 The model is based on Chisari et al. (2009).
14 As our starting point to build the SAM we used the 1997 (latest available) input-ouput tables constructed 
by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC, 2001), combined with more recent 
information from official sources and our own estimates. A full description of the SAM building process 
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remaining productive factor is physical capital. The institutional accounts include the 
government, a household (i.e, the private domestic institution), and the rest of the 
world. Tax accounts were disaggregated into eight taxes as shown in Table 3.15 There 
is one private investment account and one public investment account. Sectors such as 
Electricity, gas and water, Transport, and Communications are subject to a regulatory 
regime; together, they represent about 10.5% of total value added (see Table 4). The 
modeling of the labor market allows for unemployment due to the existence of a 
downward rigid real wage.
Among the primary factors of production, labor is mobile between sectors while 
capital is sector-specific. The model distinguishes the following four uses for domestic 
production: intermediate (firms), final (households and government), investment 
(private and public), and exports (rest of the world). This differentiation allows us to 
take into account the functioning of the Argentine tax system. Specifically, we model 
the value added tax avoiding the cascading effect on intermediate transactions. Each 
household has a nested CES utility function defined over consumption of commodities 
and leisure - indicating that labor supply is endogenous. The institutional savings can 
be used for purchasing a capital good (i.e., real investment), or bonds (i.e., financial 
investment).
In order to compute the MCPF we assume that government consumption and savings 
are fixed in real terms and, consequently, any change in tax revenue is transferred to 
households as a lump sum.
15 Notice that in the model, some of these taxes are aggregated into an indirect tax.
TABLE 2
AGGREGATED SAM ARGENTINA 2004
(in billions of pesos)
 act com lab cap hhd gov row s-i total
act 772  772
com 352   257 50 115 63 836
lab 91        91
cap 248        248
hhd 91 223 60  373
gov 37 64  14 5 120
row 44 25 18 20 108
s-i     84 11 –8  88
total 772 836 91 248 373 120 108 88  
Source: SAM Argentina 2004.
88 REVISTA DE ANALISIS ECONOMICO, VOL. 25, Nº 1
TABLE 3
TAX REVENUE ARGENTINA 2004
Tax instrument
Tax revenue
billion $ % total % GDP
Value added 24.88 20.7 5.7
Turnover 11.56 9.6 2.7
Labor 16.27 13.5 3.8
Capital 19.24 16.0 4.4
Income 11.41 9.5 2.6
Tariffs 3.17 2.6 0.7
Exports 8.71 7.2 2.0
Other indirect 19.06 15.8 4.4
Total 114.29 94.9 26.4
Source: SAM Argentina 2004. 
TABLE 4





Non-regulated 90.8 88.6 90.8 89.0 89.5
Regulated 9.2 11.4 9.2 11.0 10.5
Electricity, gas and water 2.4 0.0 2.4 1.7 1.7
Transport 4.4 11.4 4.4 6.2 6.2
Communications 2.4 0.0 2.4 3.1 2.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: SAM Argentina 2004.
5. THE COMPUTATION OF MCPF FOR ARGENTINA
In order to compute the MCPF, we assume that the government keeps its expenses 
in commodities, bonds (issued by the households and the rest of the world), and physical 
investment constant. Therefore, as mentioned above, the additional tax revenue is 
redistributed to the households as a lump-sum transfer.
In all simulations we will assume that the marginal revenue is collected by 
increasing tax rates by 10%. We compute the MCPF associated with different tax 
instruments using the following formula:





















where EV is the equivalent variation and TREV0 (TREV) is the initial (counterfactual) 
tax revenue. The value of the additional tax revenue is subtracted from the change 
in welfare because the MCPF measures the cost of taxation and not the benefit of 
public spending. We compute the MCPF under different assumptions in the following 
experiments:
•	 Experiment 1 (E1). In this simulation we assume full employment, a high labor 
supply elasticity (estimated at 0.25), and that all regulated sectors (i.e., Electricity, 
gas and water, Transport and Communications) are subject to the incremental tax 
rate. Regulated prices are fixed in terms of foreign currency (i.e., see variable 
WFSTAR in the Appendix). This is our base simulation; in simulations 2-8 we 
test the sensitivity of our results to different assumptions.
•	 Experiment 2 (E2-unemp). This is similar to E1 under the assumption that the 
existence of unemployment is due to a downward rigid real wage rate (i.e., in 
terms of the consumer price index).
•	 Experiment 3 (E3-exclu). In this simulation some sectors are excluded from the 
increase in tax rates. This simulation is motivated by the existence of sectors with 
different degrees of formality or that are untaxed because of economic policy or 
social reasons. We considered two variants of this experiment. In alternative 1, 
the excluded sectors are the Food industry, beverages and tobacco, Education, 
and Health. In alternative 2, the excluded sectors are the regulated sectors.
•	 Experiment 4 (E4-regul). The number of regulated sectors is increased. We assume 
that the regulated sectors are Electricity, gas and water, Transport, Communications, 
Food industry, beverages and tobacco, Education, and Health.
•	 Experiment 5 (E5-elas). The elasticity of labor supply is decreased to 0.10. This 
experiment tests the sensitivity of our results to the value of a key parameter in 
the computation of deadweight losses.
•	 Experiment 6 (E6-cpi). In this case regulated prices are indexed to the retail price 
index (i.e., see variable CPI in the Appendix).
•	 Experiment 7 (E7-mobcap). We assume that 40% of the capital factor is perfectly 
mobile between sectors. The objective is to compare a long-run versus a short-
run situation. Notice that, in this scenario, the tax on capital is paid by specific 
as well as mobile capital.
•	 Experiment 8 (E8-rowcap). 40% of the capital factor is internationally mobile. 
We assess how the MCPF will change if capital can leave the domestic country 
when taxes are increased. The tax is paid by both types of capital.
Table 5 compares the calculation of the MCPF of the following five taxes included 
in the model: turnover, on labor, on capital, value added, and income. The MCPF of 
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each tax is computed under three different scenarios: (i) no regulation; (ii) regulation 
by price-cap; and (iii) regulation by cost-plus.
It can be seen that our estimates for the MCPF are in the range of those found in 
the literature. We can also say that the results show sensitivity to the elasticities of 
factor supply, the relative size of the regulated sector, the distortion generated by the 
regulatory regime in the commodity markets, and the presence or absence of foreign 
shareholders (i.e., international capital mobility).
We can summarize the results as follows.
1. The MCPF moves in the range of 0.67 to 1.50, depending on the type of tax used to 
increase the revenue of the government, and the assumption on price regulation. 
The only exception is the case of taxes on labor under unemployment; in that case, the 
loss of jobs increases the MCPF beyond the expected range.
2. There are differences in the estimated level of the MCPF for alternative 
regulatory regimes. Let us focus our attention first on experiment E1, the base 
case. Price-Cap regulation will reduce deadweight losses with respect to a cost-
plus regime. The results show, for example, that collecting one additional peso by 
increasing the value added tax will produce a welfare loss equivalent to 16 cents 
when no sectors are regulated. Instead, when sectors such as Electricity, gas and 
water, Transport, and Communications are regulated by a price-cap mechanism, 
the MCPF will be decreased to 9 cents (see E1 for Value Added Tax). The MCPF 
varies with the regulatory regime but the bias is always in terms of reducing its 
level in the case of price-cap. In fact, the most important (absolute) difference 
with respect to the no regulation scenario is observed for the price-cap regulatory 
regime. This result can be explained by the fact that, under cost-plus, capital 
owners do not absorb the burden of taxes, and this creates a higher cost in terms 
of distortions. On the contrary, when the regulation is by price-cap, the markets 
for goods are more isolated from the price increases due to increases in taxes. 
However, it could be expected that additional costs due to tax increases would 
be passed through to (regulated) prices and actual results would be similar to the 
cost-plus case. Of course, these estimates have to be reconsidered in long-run 
scenarios. It is not realistic to expect that tax increases will not be passed through 
to prices; however, final changes in relative prices and in costs of regulated firms 
could be difficult to calculate. Therefore, it can be expected that the actual result 
will be something between the extreme cases of price-cap and cost-plus.
3. The presence of exempted sectors increases the MCPF and the estimated 
differences between regulatory regimes. It can be observed that when some 
sectors are excluded from the increase in the tax rates, the differences between 
the MCPF with and without regulation are magnified. However, the differences 
of the MCPF between regimes also depend on the presence of already existing 
distortions and special treatments.
4. Those differences are more noticeable when regulated sectors are larger with 
respect to the rest of the economy. It is interesting to see, in Experiment 4 (E4-
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regul), that an increase in the number of sectors subject to regulation also increases 
the differences in the results by regulatory regime – compare scenarios E4 and 
E1. Therefore, the relative size of the economic sectors subject to regulation is 
relevant to our results.
5. The existence of unemployment increases the MCPF. Unemployment implies 
that the loss of jobs is very costly for aggregated welfare. If additional taxes 
increase prices, our assumption is that nominal wages will grow to keep real 
wages constant, and this creates more unemployment. The results depend then 
on the assumption of wage indexation when markets are out of equilibrium.
6. The MCPF is lower when revenue is obtained through several taxes 
simultaneously instead of with only one tax. Notice also (last rows) that when 
several taxes are increased simultaneously the MCPF is lower than the MCPF for 
some of them, like the VAT. This result coincides with the findings of Warlters and 
Auriol (2005) and seems to be a “second best effect”; that is, there are distortions 
that are cancelled among themselves.
7. MCPF is lower if labor supply is more inelastic. As expected, the reduction of the 
elasticity of labor supply reduces the magnitude of the distortions and therefore the 
MCPF level (see E5-elas). If we recall Feldstein (1997), one of the reasons for the 
existence of distortions is the assumption of positive labor supply elasticity. Taxes 
impact on the relative price of goods and leisure and create a deadweight loss.
8. The MCPF increases when capital can move between sectors. As can be seen 
by comparing the base simulation (E1) and experiment E7-mobcap, the MCPF 
increases when part of the capital factor can move freely between sectors after 
increasing the tax rates.
9. The MCPF will be lower (or even negative) under price-cap when capital is 
internationally mobile. And this calls attention to the sensitivity of results to the 
(external) closure rule of the model (i.e., if the economy is open to trade and capital 
movements or not). In the case of Argentina, some taxes show a negative MCPF 
(i.e., benefit), as can be seen for the case of taxation of capital income. This is not 
the first time it is observed (see also Warlters and Auriol (2005)), and it is explained 
by the fact that part of the tax burden is passed-through to foreign owners of capital. 
Clearly, this marginal benefit is unsustainable in a long run situation with full capital 
mobility.16 This is confirmed in experiment E8-rowcap: when a certain proportion of 
16 One finding that Chisari et al. (2003) obtained with a similar model is that differences exist in the 
performance required of the trade balance depending on the regulatory regime of the tariffs. If a firm 
is to achieve internal efficiency yields, for example, the price-cap regulation generates benefits that 
must eventually return the invested capital. It is highly probable that part of these dividends are legally 
transferred, as is their right, to the foreign owners or simply used to purchase foreign assets –a question 
of preference– even if the owners of the benefits are local. This must place greater pressure on the trade 
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the capital is mobile between countries, the observed differences between regimes 
tend to be reduced. It is already known that domestic authorities could favor one 
regime or the other, and the corresponding power of incentives, depending on the 
share of foreign agents in total capital of regulated sectors. What our result shows 
is that the MCPF itself might depend on that share. Consistently, the effort of the 
economy (in terms of exports with respect to GDP) must be lower under price-cap 
than under cost-plus, when there are tax increases; this is captured in the simulations 
because there is a lower transfer of dividends abroad.
We also tested the sensitivity of our results to the increase in the tax rates 
(50% instead of 10%) and to the value of Armington elasticities (i.e., the degree of 
substitutability between domestic and imported goods). As expected, as we increase 
the nominal tax rate, the MCPF is also increased, suggesting that the marginal cost is 
higher than the average cost. And we can see that an increase in Armington elasticities 
also increases the MCPF, since consumers are more able to substitute their domestic 
consumption basket for imported goods.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have estimated the MCPF for Argentina using a computable 
general equilibrium model calibrated with a Social Accounting Matrix as of 2004. 
The estimates obtained are in the range of the results found in the literature for other 
countries. Moreover, we find that the MCPF is sensitive to the type of price regulation 
used for industries under regulatory supervision. However, the cost-plus regulatory 
regime tends to mimic the results of the no regulation case, under a great variety of 
simulation and cases.
The presence of a price-cap modifies the capacity of passing through additional 
costs to consumers, and creates implicit transfers from shareholders to consumers 
when relative prices change against the regulated price. The result is that in most cases 
the MCPF is lower under price-cap than under cost-plus or under no regulation. One 
important implication is that public projects will be approved more easily in countries 
where price-cap regulatory regimes prevail and are used more frequently. Under price-
cap there is a reason for being light handed when subsidies are granted, since the cost 
of obtaining the fiscal resources is reduced as regards a similar economy that regulates 
via cost-plus. The effect is even more important when shareholders reside in the rest 
of the world and their welfare is not fully accounted for in social welfare. The last 
balance than a rate of return regulation, according to which the tariff would drop together with a drop 
in costs. The effect is not generally considered among the elements evaluated when deciding whether 
to opt for price-cap or cost-plus; what is considered is the problem of distortions arising from the taxes 
used to subsidize inefficient enterprises. The latter tends to favor the price cap; instead, the impact 
on the trade balance offers a convincing argument for the cost plus. There is an expected efficiency 
loss because cost plus does not control opportunism; this loss in efficiency could force up the level of 
imports if the input is not produced domestically. Note that we are comparing both possibilities.
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result is due to the fact that international transfers (i.e., dividends) put the trade balance 
under stress and are more demanding on the efforts of the economy to export.
Our results also show that differences in MCPF are larger when price regulations 
are used on a wider portion of the economy. Less developed economies are prone to 
use price controls as an instrument of economic policy, even in the form of threats 
and even on activities open to competition. Therefore, in those economies the share 
of sectors under regulation in total GDP can be substantial and, consequently, have 
a greater impact on MCPF.
Finally, we find that the MCPF depends on the type of tax used to collect 
revenue. For the case of Argentina, the VAT has a much higher MCPF than other 
taxes, like the sales tax, which are traditionally reckoned as more costly in terms of 
inefficiencies in the allocation of resources. The reason lies in the large differences 
that exist in the treatment of some sectors, and in the abundance of exemptions and 
special regimes.
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APPENDIX
THE CGE MODEL
This Appendix presents the CGE model mathematical statement. The following 
notation is used: upper case letters for endogenous variables, lower case letters for 
exogenous variables, and Greek letters stand for behavioral parameters. When a 
variable name is followed by zero, it refers to an initial value (i.e., reported by the 
SAM). The following indexes are used: s for goods or sectors (each sector produces 
only one good), f for factors, b for bonds, i for institutions, and h for households. 
Quantity (respectively price) variables are identified with an initial Q (respectively 
P for Price variables).
VARIABLES
Quantities
QAGOVs Armington composite good s in gov utility (consumption)
QAHHDsh Armington composite good s in hhd h utility (consumption)
QAINTss’ Armington composite good s in intermediate consumption sector s .́
QAINVs Armington composite good s in private investment
QAINVGs Armington composite good s in public investment
QAROWs Armington composite good s in row utility (consumption)
QBONDENDOWib bond b endowment of institution i
QBONDGOVb gov bond b demand
QBONDHHDbh demand for bond b hhd h
QBONDROWb demand for bond b row
QBONDTOTGOV savings in bonds gov
QBONDTOTHHDh savings in bonds hhd h
QBONDTOTROW savings in bonds row
QCONHHDh total (goods) consumption hhd h
QDGOVs demand domestic good s in gov utility
QDHHDsh demand domestic good s in hhd h utility
QDINTss’ demand domestic good s in intermediate consumption sector sp
QDINVs demand domesic good s in private investment
QDINVGs demand domestic good s in public investment
QDROWs demand domestic good s in row utility
QDUEXPs production domestic good s for export
QDUFINs production domestic good s for final consumption
QDUINTs production domestic good s for intermediate consumption
QDUINVs production domestic good s for investment
QFfs demand factor f by sector s
QFSTARs demand factor fstar by (foreign) producer of imported good s
QFSTARENDOW endowment factor f row
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QFACSUPif supply factor f by institution i
QGTRAN demand gov transfers by gov
QGTRANENDOWi endowment gov transfers by institution i
QINTAs intermediate inputs composite used in sector s
QINTAUEXPs intermediate inputs for use in production for export good s
QINTAUFINs intermediate inputs for use in production for final consumption 
good s
QINTAUINTs intermediate inputs used in production for intermediate consumption 
good s
QINTAUINVs intermediate inputs for use in production for investment good s
QINVGOV investment demand by gov
QINVHHDh investment demand by hhd h
QINVROW investment demand by row (rest of the world)
QLEISUREhf demand for leisure of factor f by hhd h
QMGOVs demand for imported good s in gov utility
QMHHDsh demand for imported good s in hhd h utility
QMINTss’ demand for imported good s in intermediate consumption sector s´
QMINVs demand for imported good s in private investment
QMINVGs demand for imported good s in public investment
QMROWs demand for imported good s in r.o.w. utility
QMTOTs production imported good s
QUNEMPf unemployment level of factor f
QUTGOV gov utility
QUTHHDh hhd h utility
QUTINV private investment production
QUTINVG public investment production
QUTROW r.o.w. utility
QVAs value added in sector s (all uses of domestic production)
QVAUEXPs value added for use in export good s
QVAUFINs value added for use in final consumption good s
QVAUINTs value added for use in intermediate consumption good s
QVAUINVs value added for use in investment good s
Prices
CPI consumer domestic price index
CPIARMING consumer (Armington) price index
PAGOVs price QAGOV





PBONDb price bonds b
PBONDTOTHHDh price QBONDTOTHHD hhd h
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BPONDTOTGOV price QBONDTOTGOV
PBONDTOTROW price QBONDTOTROW
PCONHHDh price QCONHHD hhd h
PGTRAN price QGTRAN
PINTAs price QINTA











WFf wage of factor f
WFDIFfs wage of factor f in sector s
WFREALf real wage rate factor f
WFSTAR wage of factor fstar in imports production
Incomes
YGOV income gov





Uf rate of unemployment of factor f
Regulatory regimes (equivalent taxes)
REGFfs ad-valorem tax used to regulate wage factor f (cost-plus)
REGAUINTs a-v.t. used to regulate price good s for intermediate consumption 
(price-cap)
REGAUFINs a-v.t. used to regulate price good s for final consumption (price-
cap)
REGAUINVs a-v.t. used to regulate price of good s for investment (price-cap)
REGAUEXPs a-v.t. used to regulate price of good s for export (price-cap)
TRANREGF a-v.t. transfer (implicit tax collection) due to regulation to wage 
of factor f (cost-plus)
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TRANGERA a-v.t. transfer (implicit tax collection) due to regulation to price 
of good s (price-cap)
PUINTREALs real price of good s for intermediate consumption
PUFINREALs real price of good s for final consumption
PUINVREALs real price of good s for investment
PUEXPREALs real price of good s for export
WFDIFREALfs real wage of factor f in sector s
PUINTWFSTARs real price of good s for intermediate consumption in terms of 
WFSTAR
PUFINWFSTARs real price of good s for final consumption in terms of 
WFSTAR
PUINVWFSTARs real price of good s for investment in terms of WFSTAR
PUEXPWFSTARs real price of good s for export in terms of WFSTAR
WFDIFWFSTARfs real wage of factor f in sector s in terms of WFSTAR
Closure rule for government
FIXGBOND if flex QGBONDTOTGOV is fixed
FIXGCON if flex QUTGOV is fixed
FIXGINV if flex QINVGOV is fixed
Closure rule for r.o.w.
FIXBONDROW if flex QBONDROW is fixed
EQUATIONS
Value added block
Equations (1) and (2) are the first order conditions (FOC) in the firm cost 
minimization problem for mobile and specific factors, respectively. Equation (3) is 
the Cobb-Douglas value added production function. The parameter chgtec(f,s) can be 
used to model a factor-specific technical change in a particular sector.
 WF tf REGF QF PVA QVA f fmof fs fs fs fs
VA
s s1+ +( ) = ∈a vil  (1)
 WFDIF tf REGF QF PVA QVA ffs fs fs fs fs
VA
s s1+ +( ) = a ∈ fespec  (2)






= ( )∏β a  (3)
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Intermediate inputs block
Equations (4) and (5) are the FOC for the intermediate input demand. Equations 
(6) to (9) refer to the choice between domestic and imported intermediate inputs 
following the usual assumption of product differentiation according to their country of 
origin (Armington, 1969). A CES function is used to model imperfect substitutability 
between imports and domestic commodities (equation (6)).17-18 Equation (7) shows the 
tangency condition that determines the optimal mix between domestic and imported 
commodities. Equation (9) computes the supply price of the composite commodity 
as a weighted average of the domestic and imported prices. In equations (7) and (9) 
tmuint is the tariff faced by firms.
When QMINTs s'
0 0>  and QDINTs s' ,
0 0>  the model includes equations (6) and (7). 
Alternatively, if QMINTs s'
0 0=  or QDINTs s' ,
0 0=  the model includes equation (8).
 QAINT io QINTAss ss s' ' '=  (4)
 PINTA QINTA PAINT QAINTs s s s s s
s
= ∑ ' '
'
 (5)







' ' ' '


















































 QAINT QMINT QDINTs s s s s s' ' '= +  (8)
 PAINT QAINT PM tmint QMINT Ps s s s s s s s s' ' ' ' '= +( ) +1 UINT QDINTs s s' '  (9)
Intermediate use block
Domestic production for intermediate consumption is a Leontief (i.e., fixed 
coefficients) function of the quantities of value added (equation (10)) and an aggregate 
intermediate input (equation (11)).19 The price of value added is calculated, implicitly, 
in equation (12); the rest of the variables are determined elsewhere in the model. 
The taxes faced by the domestic production for intermediate consumption are (1) the 
17 Additionally, the choice between domestic and imported varieties of the same good for intermediate 
consumption can be made according to a Leontief function.
18 The substitution elasticity between domestic commodities and imports is σ ρc qc= −( )1 1 .
19 Notice that the aggregate intermediate input used in all uses of the domestic production is “produced” 
in equation (4).
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activity tax (rate tauint), (2) the turnover tax (rate tiibbuint), and (3) the value added 
tax (usually, rate tivauint is zero).
 QVAUINT ivauint QDUINTs s s=  (10)
 QINTAUINT t QDUINTs s s= intuin  (11)
 
PUINT tauint tiibbuint REGAUINT QDUIs s s s1− − −( ) NT
PVA tivauint QVAUINT PINTA QINTA
s
s s s s
=
+( ) +1 UINTs  (12)
Final consumption block
Domestic production for final consumption (i.e., households and government) is 
also a Leontief function of value added (equation (13)) and an aggregate intermediate 
input (equation (14)). The price of value added in the production for final consumption 
is computed in equation (15).
 QVAUFIN ivaufin QDUFINs s s=  (13)
 QINTAUFIN ufin QDUFINs s s= int  (14)
 
PUFIN taufin tiibbufin REGAUFIN QDUFs s s s1− − −( ) IN
PVA tivaufin QVAUFIN PINTA QINTA
s
s s s s
=
+( ) +1 UFINs
 (15)
Investment use block
Domestic production for public and private investment is also a fixed coefficients 
function of value added (equation (16)) and an aggregate intermediate input (equation 
(17)). The price of value added in the production for investment is computed in 
equation (18).
 QVAUINV ivauinv QDUINVs s s=  (16)
 QINTAUINV uinv QDUINVs s s= int  (17)
 
PUINV tauinv tiibbuinv REGAUINV QDUIs s s s1− − −( ) NV
PVA tivauinv QVAUINV PINTA QINTA
s
s s s s
=
+( ) +1 UINVs
 (18)
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Export use block
Domestic production for export is also a Leontief function of value added (equation 
(19)) and an aggregate intermediate input (equation (20)). The price of value added 
in the production for export is computed in equation (21). In this case, the activity 
tax corresponds to the export tax.
 QVAUEXP ivauexp QDUEXPs s s=  (19)
 QINTAUEXP uexp QDUEXPs s s= int  (20)
 
PUEXP tauexp tiibbuexp REGAUEXP QDUEs s s s1− − −( ) XP
PVA tivauexp QVAUEXP PINTA QINTA
s
s s s s
=
+( ) +1 UEXPs  (21)
Imports block
The rest of the world produces goods demanded by the domestic economy 
(i.e., imports) and the rest of the world itself by using only one production factor 
denominated FSTAR. Equation (22) and (23) are the FOC of the cost minimization 
problem solved by the foreign firms.
 WFSTAR QFSTAR PM QMTOTs s s s=  (22)
 QFSTAR QMTOTs s=  (23)
Household consumption of goods block
Equations (24) and (25) are the FOC for the cost minimization problem solved 
by the households in order to “compose” their consumption aggregate according to 
a Cobb-Douglas utility function The households distinguish between domestic and 
imported goods according to a CES function (equations (26) to (29)).20 Equation (27) 
is the tangency condition that determines the quantities of domestic and imported 
commodities consumed by the households. Equation (29) computes the price of the 
composite Argmington good demanded by household h as a weighted average of the 
domestic and imported prices of the same good.21
20 Additionally, the model allows using a Cobb-Douglas function to produce the Armington composite 
good demanded by the households.
21 Notice that the domestic/imported composition of the Armington good is not the same for all the agents 
in the model.
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When QMHHDsh
0 0>  and QDHHDsh
0 0> ,  the model includes equations (26) 
and (27). On the other hand, if QMHHDsh
0 0=  or QDHHDsh
0 0= , the model includes 
equation (28).
 PAHHD QAHHD PCONHHD td QCONHHDsh sh sh
HHD
h h= −( )a 1 h  (24)






= ∏β a  (25)











































 QAHHD QMHHD QDHHDsh sh sh= +  (28)
 






Equations (30) and (31) are the FOC of the labor (consumption)-leisure choice 
problem faced by the households; for each factor in flab may exist a leisure demand. 
Equation (32) defines a Cobb-Douglas utility function over consumption and leisure for 
household h.22 Equation (33) computes the supply of factor flab by household h. Notice 
that maxhourh,flab is the amount of hours of factor flab that hosuehold h has available.
 PCONHHD QCONHHD PUTHHD QUTHHDh h h
CONS
h h= a  (30)
 WF QLEISURE PUTHHD QUTHflab h flab h flab
OCIO
h, ,= a HDh  (31)










 QFACSUP maxhour QLEISUREh flab h flab h flab, , ,= −  (33)
22 Additionally, the model allows using a CES utility function to model the labor-leisure choice.
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Government utility block
Government utility is “produced” according to a Cobb-Douglas function (equations 
(34) and (35)). The government also differentiates between domestic and imported 
goods according to a CES function (equations (36) and (37)).23 Equation (38) replaces 
equations (36) and (37) when the government demands a good from only one origin.24 
Equation (39) defines the price of the Armington composite good consumed by the 
government.
When QMGOV0 > 0 and QDGOV0 > 0, the model includes equations (37) and (37). 
Alternatively, if QMGOV0 = 0 or QDGOV0 = 0, the model includes equation (38).
 PAGOV QAGOV PUTGOV QUTGOVs s s







= ∏β a  (35)









= +−φ δ δρ −































 QAINVG QMINVG QDINVGs s s= +  (38)
 
PAGOV QAGOV PM tmgov tivamgov QMGOVs s s s s s= + +( )1
+PUFIN QDGOVs s
 (39)
Private investment (capital good) production block
Private investment (i.e., demanded by the households and the rest of the world) 
is produced by combining the different goods using a Cobb-Douglas production 
function (equations (40) and (41)).25 Also in this case, imperfect substitutability 
between domestic and imported varieties of the same good is assumed (equations 
(42) to (45)).26 When only one variety of the good is demanded, equations (42) and 
(43) are replaced by equation (44).
23 Additionally, the model allows using a Cobb-Douglas function to produce the Armington composite 
good demanded by the government.
24 This is the case in the Argentina SAM used to calibrate the model.
25 Additionally, a fixed coefficients function can be used.
26 Alternatively, a Leontief or Cobb-Douglas utility function can be used.
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 PAINV QAINV PUTINV QUTINVs s s
INV= a .  (40)




= ∏β a  (41)









= +−φ δ δρ −
































 QAINV QMINV QDINVs s s s s= + +( ) +1 tminv tivaminv  (44)
 
PAINV QAINV PM v QMINVs s s s s= + +( )1 tminv tivamin s
s sPUINV QDINV+
 (45)
Public investment (capital good) production block
Public investment is modeled similarly to the private investment (equations (46) 
to (51)). When a good is only domestic or imported, equations (48) and (49) are 
replaced by equation (50).
 PAINVG QAINVG PUTINVG QUTINVGs s s
INVG= a .  (46)




= ∏β a  (47)















































 QAINVG QMINVG QDINVGs s s= +  (50)
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Rest of the world utility block
Equations (52) and (53) show that the rest of the world has a Cobb-Douglas 
utility function. Notice that the rest of the world consumes the domestic (i.e., exports) 
and imported varieties of each good. Goods are distinguished between tradable (set 
st) and non-tradable (set snt). For the former, the rest of the world is indifferent 
between its own production (i.e, imports) and the domestic production (i.e., exports). 
Consequently, the export price for tradable goods is fixed at the world price (equations 
(54) and (55)). For the non-tradable goods, it is assumed that the rest of the world 
differentiates between the domestic and foreign varieties of the same good using a 
CES function (equations (56) and (57)).27 Equation (58) computes the price of each 
Armington composite good consumed by the rest of the world.
 PAROW QAROW PUTROW QUTROWs s s
ROW= a .  (52)




= ∏β a  (53)
for tradable goods (st),
 QAROW QDROW QMROWst st st= +  (54)
 PM PUEXPst st=  (55)
for non-tradable goods (snt),












































for all goods s,
 PAROW QAROW PM QMROW PUEXP QDROWs s s s s s= +  (58)
Households bond savings block
The households “produce” their portfolio of financial savings by combining bonds 
issued by the government and the rest of the world using a Cobb-Douglas technology 
(equations (59) and (60)).
27 Alternatively, a Leontief function can be used.
MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS AND REGULATORY REGIMES:… 107
  PBOND QBONDHHD PBONDTOTHHD QBONDTb bh bh
HBOND
h= a OTHHDh  (59)






= ∏β a  (60)
Government bond savings block
Similarly to the households, the government financial savings is a Cobb-Douglas 
function of the bonds issued by the households and the rest of the world (equations 
(61) and (62)).
 PBOND QBONDGOV PBONDTOTGOV QBONDTOTb b b







= ∏β a  (62)
Rest of the world bond savings block
The rest of the world also “produces” its financial savings by combining bonds 
issued by the households and the government using a Cobb-Douglas function (equations 
(63) and (64)). The variable FIXBONDROW is kept fixed or not depending on the 














= ∏β a  (64)
Households budget constraint block
Households spend fixed shares of their income in (utility) consumption (equation 
(65)), investment (equation (66)), and bonds (equation (67)). Equation (68) shows that 
the (full; i.e., including leisure) income of household h is the sum of factorial income, 
the value of leisure, the value of the issued bonds, the transfers received from the 
government, and the transfers received or made as a consequence of the regulatory 
regime if the household is the owner of the physical capital in the regulated sectors. 
Notice that the factorial income is computed as the supply excluding unemployment 
(Uf) times the factor net price. Notice that households consume the “utility” good 
produced in equation (32).
 PUTHHD QUTHHD shrhcon YHHDh h h h=  (65)
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 PUTINV QINVHHD shrhinv YHHDh h h. =  (66)
 PBONDTOTHHD QBONDTOTHHD shrhbond YHHDh h h h=  (67)
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Government budget constraint block
The government spends a fixed proportions of its income in consumption (equation 
(69)), investment (equation (70)), bonds (equation (71)), and transfers to the households 
(equation (72)). The government income is the sum of tax revenue, factorial income, 
income from the issued bonds, and transfers received or made as a consequence of 
the regulatory regime when the government is owner of physical capital in regulated 
sectors (equation (73)). In order to model the transfers from the government to the 
households, it is assumed that the latter have an endowment of the good QGTRAN 
demanded only by the former.
The variables FIXGCON, FIXGINV and FIXGBOND are used to choose between 
alternative closure rules for the government. When they are fixed and equal to zero, 
all the government demands are endogenous. When they are flexible and QUTGOV,  
QINVGOV and QBONDTOTGOV are fixed, any increase in the government income 
will be transferred to the households. However, the government will have to finance 
any change in the price of QUTGOV, QINVGOV and QBONDTOTGOV. This last 
closure rule was used in the computation of the MCPF. Notice that the variables 
FIXGCON, FIXGINV and FIXGBOND can be seen as tax rates that generate tax 
revenue collected by the government (equation (73)).28
 PUTGOV FIXGCON QUTGOV shrgcon YGOV1+( ) = .  (69)
 PUTINVG FIXGINV QINVGOV shrginv YGOV1+( ) = .  (70)
 PBONDTOTGOV FIXGBOND QBONDTOTGOV shrgbon1+( ) = d YGOV.  (71)
28 This formulation is equivalent to fixing the variables QUTGOV, QINVGOV, and QBONDTOTGOV at 
the same time that equations (69), (70) and (71) are dropped from the model.
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Rest of the world budget constraint block
The rest of the world spends fixed shares of its income in consumption (equation 
(74)), investment (equation (75)), and bonds savings (equation (76)). The income 
of the rest of the world is computed as the sum of factorial income including factor 
FSTAR, the income from the issued bonds, and the transfers that receives or makes 
as a consequence of the regulatory regime if the rest of the world is the owner of 
physical capital in the regulated sectors (equation (77)).
 PUTROW QUTROW shrfcon YROW. .=  (74)
 PUTINV QINVROW shrfinv YROW. .=  (75)
 PBONDTOTROW QBONDTOTROW shrfbond YROW. .=  (76)
 
YROW WF QFACSUP U PBOND QBONDENDf row f f
f








+ + TRANREGA TRANREGF+( )
 (77)
Tax revenue block
This block has only one equation that computes the total tax revenue. The model 
identifies the following tax instruments: factor tax use, production tax for the different 
uses, value added tax on imports and domestic products, tariffs, and direct tax on 
household income.
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Specific factor block
Equation (79) computes the average wage of the sector-specific factors. The 


















f fespec∈  (79)
Unemployment block
This block comprises the equations that allow to assume the existence of 
unemployment with a minimum real wage (i.e., the real wage is downward rigid). 
Equation (80) defines the consumer price index.29 Equation (81) defines a consumer 
price index that only includes domestic goods; the weights are computed as the share 
of each good in final consumption. Equation (82) defines the real wage. Equation (83) 
computes the unemployment rate as the ratio between the unemployed and the labor 
supply. Equations (84) and (85) set a lower bound for the real wage and unemployment 
rate, respectively. Finally, equation (86) is a complementarity relation that allows 
considering two regimes in the market of the factor with unemployment: i) the real 
wage is equal to the minimum and there is unemployment, or ii) the real wage is 
above the minimum and there is no unemployment. When the initial unemployment 
is zero (i.e., full employment is assumed), equation (86) holds always by making 
zero the unemployment.
 CPIARMING cwtsarming PAHHDsh sh
sh
= ∑  (80)
 CPI cwts PUFINs s
s













 WFREAL WFREALf f≥
0
 (84)
 QUNEMPf ≥ 0  (85)
29 Notice that, as a consequence of assuming that the domestic/imported composition varies between 
households, each household faces a different price PAHHD(s,h). 
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 WFREAL WFREAL QUNEMPf f f−( ) =0 0  (86)
Equilibrium conditions block
This block contains all the equilibrium conditions in the model. They equate the 
supply and demand in the different markets. Equations (87) and (88) refer to the market 
of the factor used in the production of domestic and imported goods, respectively. 
Equation (89) shows the equality between the supply of value added and the sum of 
the value added demands for the different uses of the domestic production. Equation 
(90) is similar to the previous one but refers to intermediate inputs. Equation (91) is the 
equilibrium condition in the market for imports. Notice that the demand for imports of 
the rest of the world is included. Equations (92) to (95) are the equilibrium conditions 
in the markets for domestic production. For example, equation (95) shows that the 
domestic production for exports (QDUEXPs) is equal to the demand for domestic 
production by the rest of the world (QDROWs). Equations (96) and (97) equate the 
supply and demand of private and public investment, respectively. Equation (98) is 
the equilibrium condition in the market for bond b. Finally, equation (99) equates 
the supply and demand of transfers from the government to the rest of institutions 
included in the model.




∑ ∑+ =  (87)
 QFSTARENDOW QFSTARs
s
= ∑  (88)
 QVA QVAUINT QVAUFIN QVAUINV QVAUEXPs s s s s= + + +  (89)
 QINTA QINTAUINT QINTAUFIN QINTAUINV QINs s s s= + + + TAUEXPs  (90)











∑ =  (92)
 QDHHD QDGOV QDUFINsh
h
s s∑ + =  (93)
 QDINV QDINVG QDUINVs s s+ =  (94)
 QDROW QDUEXPs s=  (95)
 QUTINV QINVHHD QINVROWh
h
= +∑  (96)
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 QUTINVG QINVGOV=  (97)




b∑ ∑= + + ROWb  (98)
 QGTRAN QGTRANENDOWi
i
= ∑  (99)
Regulation block
Equations (100) and (101) are used to compute the transfer (i.e., implicit tax 
revenue) necessary to regulate the price of good s and the wage of factor f in sector 
s, respectively. These transfers are part of the income of institutions (see equations 
(68), (73) and (77)). Notice that the value of those transfers can be negative. Equations 
(102) to (105) compute the price in terms of the CPI of the different possible uses for 
each good. When a sector is regulated by price-cap, those prices are kept constant. 
Equation (106) defines the real wage of factor f in the sector s. Equations (107) to 
(111) are used to define the regulated real prices in terms of the price of the factor 
owned by the rest of the world.
 



































 PUINTREAL CPIARMING PUINTs s=  (102)
 PUFINREAL CPIARMING PUFINs s=  (103)
 PUINVREAL CPIARMING PUINVs s=  (104)
 PUEXPREAL CPIARMING PUEXPs s=  (105)
 WFDIFREAL CPIARMING WFDIFfs fs=  (106)
 PUINTWFSTAR WFSTAR PUINTs s=  (107)
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 PUFINWFSTAR WFSTAR PUFINs s=  (108)
 PUINVWFSTAR WFSTAR PUINVs s=  (109)
 PUEXPWFSTAR WFSTAR PUEXPs s=  (110)
 WFDIFWFSTAR WFSTAR WFDIFfs fs=  (111)
Regulated sectors
The model considers two alternative regulatory regimes: price cap, and cost-plus 
or rate of return regulation. In the first case, the real price (i.e., in terms of the CPI) 
of the regulated good is fixed at the same time that the variables REGAUINT(reg), 
REGAUFIN(reg), REGAUINV(reg) y REGAUEXP(reg) are flexible. In the second 
case, the real wage of the physical capital in the regulated sector is fixed at the 
same time that the variable REGF(fcap,reg) is flexible. In both cases, the variables 
REGAUINT(reg), REGAUFIN(reg), REGAUINV(reg) and REGAUEXP(reg), and 
REGF(fcap,reg) operate as (implicit) taxes that generate a tax revenue that is collected 
by the owners (households, government, rest of the world) of the physical capital in 
the regulated sectors. Notice that the tax collection can be negative (i.e., subsidy).
Closure rule
Assuming that all goods are tradable, the model has the following dimensions in 
terms of variables and equations.
s s x s b b x h f f x s h x f h i x b s x h 1
Variables 51 4 4 1 4 5 2 9 2 4 30 
Equations 47 4 3 1 4 3 2 8 1 4 25 
Difference 4 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 5 
In order to have a square model with the same number of variables and equations, 
it is necessary to fix the value of 4 s + b + 2 (f x s) + h + (i x b) + 5 variables. We select 
the following:REGAUINTs, REGAUFINs, REGAUINVs and REGAUEXPs  
when there 
are no sectors regulated by price-cap; REGFfs when there are no sectors regulated by 
the rate of return on physical capital; WFDIFfs for the mobile factors between sectors 
and QFfs for the sector-specific factors; QFSUPif (includes unemployment) for the 
institutions different from the households that do not face a labor-leisure choice and 
QFSTARENDOW so that factor endowments are fixed; QGTRANENDOWh so that 
the share of each household in the government transfers is fixed; QBONDENDOWib 
so that the endowment of bonds b of each institution i is fixed; FIXBONDROWb in 
order to have a flexible demand for bonds by the rest of the world; and QUTGOV, 
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QINVGOV and QBONDTOTGOV in order to fix the government demand for goods, 
investment, and bonds.
The model numeraire is the factor FSTAR that the rest of the world employs to 
produce imports; its wage is fixed at one. Then, by virtue of Walras law, an equation 
can be dropped from the model. Alternatively, an endogenous variable (i.e., WALRAS) 
can be added to the model; its value must be zero in equilibrium.
Figure A.1 sums up the structure of the model for the production side that is 
utilized for final consumption (i.e., household and government consumption). The other 
destinations for domestic production are modeled in the same way. Figure A.2 presents 
the decomposition of households’ expenditure in consumption goods (traditional utility 
function), investment in physical assets (indicated as “Investment”) and in financial 
instruments (called “Savings”). The government, as well as the rest of the world, is 
modeled as a household. The bottom part of each box shows the corresponding variable 
in the model mathematical statement. The following abbreviations are used for the 
functional forms: LF stands for Leontief, CD for Cobb-Douglas, and CES for Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution. The figure shows, for example, that labor and capital are 
combined with a Cobb-Douglas production function to produce value added. See the 
Appendix for a detailed presentation of the model.
FIGURE A.1
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FIGURE A.2
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